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Abstract: This article explores how and why some national governments seek to manage and 
control tourist-oriented narratives about historic sites and artefacts. Discussing ethnographic 
research among tour guides, tourists and government representatives in Oman, the paper 
reveals how the country’s historic sites are overwhelmingly staged and presented without 
historical information. Instead, history is displaced by sanitised presentations of cultural 
heritage, the display of which draws an "exotic veil", crafted to enchant and deflect tourist 
attention from politically sensitive historical events and legacies. The study examines reasons 
for this policy, and its implications for tourists and those working in the tourism industry. 
Many of Oman’s tour guides and site representatives are from marginalised groupings, 
experiencing inequalities due to historical family, tribal and former slave status. The state- 
sustained exotic veil on history means that such workers are obliged to collude in denying the 
historical reasons for their own experiences of injustice and inequality. 
 





Zeppell and Hall (1991) observed how some national governments and their agencies seek to 
control how history is presented to tourists. The ways in which they do this, and the degrees  
to which they do this, are diverse. In some countries, the presentation of history is politically 
sensitive, ensuring that certain events are excluded from tourist narratives altogether. In other 
cases, political/ moral outrages such as the Holocaust or the Srebrenica genocide become the 
focus of tourist interest, with state-sanctioned narratives about such events constituting a key 
interactive feature of the visitor experience (Podoshen, 2017; Naef & Ploner, 2016). As 
Holguin (2005) observed, in Spain, the Franco era is rarely discussed in commercial tourist 
discourse, and remains obscured by state authorities. Meanwhile, Rivera (2008) examined 
how and why Croatia obfuscates its socialist Yugoslav past (1945-1991) through expounding 
nationalist histories that celebrate its pre-World War II "golden ages" (Goulding & Domic, 
2009). The Croatian state and its agencies thereby represent the country as being untainted by 
Yugoslavia, with its Slavic roots (Rivera, 2008). Destination marketing place representations 
are thus socially-constructed and sustained for particular purposes by particular groups. They 
are clearly not value free expressions of place identity, but, to varying degrees, are  
influenced, managed and sustained by political elites (Pritchard & Morgan, 2001, p. 177; 
Ateljevic & Doorne, 2002). 
 
Examining the political nature of historical narratives in tourism raises interesting analytical 
issues. It highlights the importance to political elites of presenting a coherent narrative of 
statehood, and its legitimacy, to visitors. It raises the question of why some national and 
regional governments seek to control historical narratives, and for what political purposes. It 
reveals contradictions between academic and popular historical narratives, and those 
presented by the state and its agencies; and it highlights the role of historical narrative in the 
experience of visitors. 
 
This paper explores these issues by focusing on the staging and presentation of historical sites 
and artefacts for foreign visitors to the Sultanate of Oman. Doing so reveals how government-
managed tourism policies, facilities and activities artfully present statehood in ways that 
shield visitors from the realities of Oman’s turbulent political history. This can be understood 
as the state imposing an "exotic veil" on history – a policy of requiring those involved  in  the 
tourism industry to  self-Orientalise (Feighery,  2012),  to  stage  and  enact a 
form of authenticity intended to enchant visitors and convince them that they are  
experiencing the “real" country and its "exotic" culture, while deflecting attention from deep- 
seated inequalities and political controversies (MacCannell, 1973, 1976; Cohen, 1988). 
Drawing on an ethnographic research project, the study explores various aspects of this exotic 
veil over history: the reasons for its imposition, and how it is managed; its performative 
realisation by institutions, tour guides and other workers in the tourism and  hospitality 
sectors; its experiential implications for tourists; and its political and existential significance 
for different sectors of Omani society. 
 
The exotic veil involves the sensory manipulation of tourist perceptions in order to enchant 
and obscure. Berelson and Steiner (1964, p. 8) defined perception as the “complex process by 
which people select, organise, and interpret sensory stimulation into a meaningful and 
coherent picture of the world.” Staging Orientalised tourism encounters involves influencing 
visitors’ perceptions through music, text, video presentations, perfumes/ odours, lighting and 
sound. Equally important in this Orientalisation is the exclusion of certain contradictory 
sights, sounds, smells and information, such as: visions of poverty, disability or modernity; 
bad smells; loud noise; and, crucially, the exclusion of historical and/ or political realities.  
The shaping of tourist perceptions involves much more than a dyadic relationship between 
stager and perceiver, but involves the accumulated experience, knowledge and expectations  
of the visitor, and prior and emerging discourses and narratives among fellow tourists. 
 
In an earlier examination of tourism video materials, Feighery (2012, p. 275) highlighted the 
political nature of Oman’s official touristic narratives, arguing that they present the country 
as, 
 
“unified, stable, traditional, and welcoming, while simultaneously commodifying its heritage, 
culture, and natural environment in support of government-sponsored tourism 
developments… In that process of economic and social development and nation building, the 
Omani regime has interpolated a diversity of tribal peoples and cultures into an Omani 
identity. Thus, the film can be viewed as contributing to the current administration’s efforts to 
maintain legitimacy over the entire territory and peoples of Oman.” 
Following on from Feighery’s (2012) observations, this paper explores the treatment of 
history in Oman’s presentation of historical sites and artefacts to tourists, by seeking answers 
to the following questions: 
 
1. How does the Omani government, and its agencies, manage perceptions of history 
among tourists in Oman? 
2. What explanatory and contextual narratives are provided to tourists visiting historical 
sites and artefacts? 
3. How do tourists perceive and understand these narratives, and integrate them into 
their experiences of visiting Oman? 
4. How do tourism workers perceive and understand these narratives, and what do they 
think about tourists integrating such narratives into their experiences of visiting 
Oman? 
 
The remainder of this paper seeks to answer these questions, and to explore the implications 
of the findings for ongoing debates about tourism management, authenticity and self- 





Said (1978) examined the constitution of the "West" in relation to an externalised "Eastern", 
Islamic "other", and highlighted modes of representation of an imagined, discursively 
constructed place called the "Orient" or the "East" at specific junctures in the history of those 
cultures that are loosely termed "the West". Said’s (1978) concept of Orientalism frames 
Western definitions of non-European cultures as exotic, sensual, enchanting and alluring. 
Orientalising exaggerates difference at the expense of shared humanity, resulting in a 
Derridan alterity, presenting non-Western cultures as being imbued with exotic otherness to 
be authentically experienced and consumed (Derrida, 1978). Bryce (2012) stressed the power 
of such binary representations as "West/East", "Europe/Islam" and "modernity/history" in 
commercial place promotion, arguing that tourism often sustains political structures and 
inequalities, which have subjective, spatial and political consequences for the understanding 
of those places; and these cannot be separated from tourism’s invitation to the pleasurable 
consumption of "difference". Observing that many tourists seek to situate themselves in 
hegemonic notions  of  the past,  Kerrigan, Shivanandan  and Hede  (2012)  examined tourism 
marketing of India, which featured familiar colonial images when targeting British tourists.  
As Bryce, MacLaren and O’Gorman (2013) observe, this is by no means a one-way process, 
as indigenous destination marketers recognise the commercial power of such motifs, and 
feature them accordingly. 
 
Feighery (2012) recognised the pressure on Middle Eastern countries, and those involved in 
providing tourist services in the region, to self-Orientalise in order to present themselves as 
attractive and exotic to tourists. Destination marketers have responded to this trope 
accordingly. As Cohen (1985) observed, the intention of such presentations of local culture is 
to provide tourists with a self-satisfying sense that they are encountering real, authentic, 
traditional culture - which some visitors find more satisfying and gratifying than the 
"fakeries" and "hedonisms" of mass tourism. This, of course, can lead to uncomfortable 
contradictions between locals and visitors. Locals may find the playing out of traditions at 
odds with their own modern lived experience, while they objectify and commodify key 
aspects of their traditions for touristic consumption, and exaggerate, simplify or pervert the 
actual culture within which they live (Korpela, 2010). However, locals and state agencies are 
economically incentivised to self-Orientalise (Feighery, 2012) and weave an intoxicating 
allure, which encourages return visits and the buying of local craftwork; and which enhances 
the overall popularity of the sites. Many tourists visit these spaces and cultures not to 
experience modernities and post-modernities resonant with their own cultures, but to immerse 
themselves in other-worldliness, and thereby experience enchantment and excitement - a 
feeling of existential adventure and spiritual enrichment from supposed experience of "the 
other", and immersion in "otherness" (Bloch, 2017). 
 
What is less explored in debates about authenticity and tourism is how self-Orientalisation 
can be used to obscure politically sensitive histories. This process can be usefully viewed as 
the social construction and sustaining of an “exotic veil” – the sensory crafting of selected 
aspects of the country’s cultural heritage to enchant visitors, and obscure history and political 
conflicts from them (see, for instance, Kerrigan, Shivanandan, & Hede, 2012; Johnson, 2010; 
Bryce, MacLaren, & O’Gorman, 2013). Studying these issues in Oman gives us the 
opportunity to examine the reasons for, and realities of, the state-sanctioned veil on history, 
and to appreciate its experiential and political consequences for visitors, locals and political 
elites. It thus allows us critically to explore and evaluate the use and usefulness of theoretical 
conceptions of authenticity and self-Orientalisation in Middle Eastern tourism. 
 
Why does Omani history need to be hidden, or veiled, from tourists? 
 
 
Three great schisms have structured Omani society and its political history. The first is the 
physical barrier of the Hajar mountains, which have long divided the tribes of Oman into 
those of the coast (Muscat and the Batinah region) and the interior (the Dakhiliyah region) 
(see Figure 1). Throughout the country’s history, there have been periodic tensions between 
the Omani Interior, generally ruled by elected Ibadi Imams, and the coastal Sultanate of 
Muscat (see Appendix 1). Indeed, before 1970, the official name of the country was “Muscat 
and Oman”. Muscat (Muttrah) harbour was the possession of successive foreign powers, such 
as the Portuguese, Persian and Ottoman empires. Each attempted to impose order on the 








The second great schism is the division of the numerous Omani Arab tribes into two meta- 
tribal affiliations: the Azd tribes, which constitute a branch of the Kahlani tribes of the south, 
which had migrated to Oman from what is now Yemen in search of sustainable water 
resources; and the Adnani tribes of the north, which claimed lineage to Prophet Mohammed, 
and raised the ruling tribes of the pre-modern and modern ages, i.e. the Nabhani (1154-1624), 
the Yaruba (1624-1742) and, finally, the Bu Said dynasty, which rules today. 
 
A third schism is more complex, involving social, political and economic differences 
sustained in Oman’s cultural diversity. Three major ethnic minorities in Oman have national 
citizenship. These include Omanis not of Arab origins, such as the Belushi and Zajali, who 
migrated from Baluchistan on the border between Pakistan and Iran over the past three to  
four hundred years. Despite their long presence in Oman, many remain fluent in Farsi or  
Urdu dialects. The second ethnic group are the Lawati, who migrated from the Sindh region  
of Pakistan over the centuries, and clustered around the trading hub of Muttrah harbour near 
Muscat. Lawatis are Shia, and retain their Khojki language (Valeri, 2010). A third ethnic 
minority grouping is made up of Zanzibaris, who migrated from former Omani territorial 
possessions of East Africa in the 1970s. Many had intermarried with indigenous Africans. 
Omani Zanzibari are mostly fluent in English and Swahili, and the first generation of 
returnees still struggle with communicating in Arabic (Valeri, 2009). 
 
Ibadism, empire and slavery 
 
 
Religiously, Omani history is rooted in its indigenous form of Islam, Ibadism, which, as 
Phillips (1971) observed, is foundational of Omani national identity. Politically, the country’s 
history has been a story of prominent tribal dynasties - the Nabhani (1154-1624), the Yaruba 
(1624-1742) from the interior, and finally the Bu Saíd dynasty from the coast. The Nabhani 
dynasty ruled Oman until 1624, when, after a period of tribal warfare, it lost out in its 
struggles against the Yaruba. The victorious leader, Nasir bin Mursid bin Sultan al Yaruba, 
and his cousin and successor Sultan bin Saif al-Yaruba, consolidated the dynasty’s power, 
freed the country’s seaboard from Portuguese occupation, and united the tribes of the coast 
and the interior (Risso, 1989). The Yaruba dynasty furthered Oman’s economic and political 
interests, acquiring former Portuguese colonies in East Africa - including Zanzibar. Through 
increasing command of these logistical routes Oman profited from trade in ivory, metals, 
cloves and slaves (Suzuki, 2017). From the mid-17th century, the Yaruba dynasty expanded 
the trading empire of Oman to key ports and vassal states in Zanzibar, Eastern Africa, the 
Western seaboard of India and modern-day Pakistan and Iran (notably Baluchistan). This 
logistical and trading network became what is commonly called, the “Omani Empire”, feted 
in touristic narratives about the history of the country (Feighery, 2012). 
 
The Bu Said dynasty ruled from 1749, when Imam Ahmed bin Said al Bu Said, Wali of 
Sohar, united Muscat and Oman and established what was recognisably a state. Later, during 
Sultan Said bin Sultan Al-Said's rule (1806–1856), the country consolidated economic and 
political hegemony over its East African colonies and Indian colonies, and increasingly 
profited from Zanzibar’s role as a key hub in the slave trade from the African seaboard 
through the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. However, the British, the dominant naval power of  
the time, became increasingly active in intercepting and blocking the transportation of slaves 
along the Eastern seaboard of Africa, and between Zanzibar and Oman. This disrupted Omani 
trade, and the country went into steep economic decline. During the subsequent recession, 
many Omani families migrated to Zanzibar, and the population of Muscat fell dramatically 
between the 1850s and 1870s. The United Kingdom exploited Oman’s weakened state to 
seize its overseas territories, and by 1890 Oman was an isolated and poor "failed state". This 
economic and demographic decline exacerbated conflict between the two key political blocs– 
the coast and the interior - and the country descended into an extended period of tribal 
warfare, which was suspended only temporarily by the signing of the Treaty of Seeb in 1913 
(Risso, 1989). 
 
Two major civil wars have taken place in the past sixty five years, and they continue to 
resonate today. The first was the Jebel al Akhdar war (1954-1959), where the tribes of the 
Dakhiliyah and Hajar mountain regions allied themselves with Saudi Arabia and rebelled 
against the Sultanate. In the destructive and protracted struggle that ensued, the Sultan, with 
British support, attempted to regain the Jebel al Akhdar region and unify the country again 
through force. However, the new Imam led a sporadic five-year rebellion against the Sultan's 
efforts to extend government control into the interior. The insurgents were finally defeated in 
1959 with British help. The Sultan then terminated the Treaty of Seeb and eliminated the 
office of the Imam, who took refuge in Saudi Arabia. In the early 1960s, the Imam continued 
to agitate against the Sultan, and won political support from his Saudi hosts and other Arab 
governments for reinstatement of the Imamate. However, this alliance ended in the 1980s, as 
Sultan Qaboos consolidated his political hegemony over the interior region (Joyce, 1995). 
 
The second major civil war was the Dhofar Rebellion (1962-1975) in which the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) provided 
military and logistical support for North Yemeni communist insurgents allied with southern 
Omani tribes, who were involved in a military campaign to overthrow the Islamic Sultanate. 
Qaboos seized the throne in the midst of this conflict, and - with British support – he 
eventually suppressed the insurgents, re-established order, and set to work on unifying the 
country. The succession and subsequent success of Sultan Qaboos in military, economic, 
social and nation-building terms meant that his accession marks the beginning of what is 
officially called the “Renaissance” of the country (Phillips & Hunt, 2017). A clear 
demarcation is thereby made in historical, political and economic discourse in Oman between 
the violent and impoverished time before his rule, and the period of political stability and 
prosperity after he took power. That notwithstanding, the bloody recent history of tribal 
conflict in Oman is remembered among the older generations in Oman; and the tectonic 
regional and tribal pressure-points persist to this day, though in diminished potency (Phillips 





When Sultan Qaboos took over an impoverished and violent country in 1970, he quickly set  
to developing the institutions of governance and state, and to building national unity. In 
promoting unity, the Sultan was - and is - celebrated as the marker between tribal chaos and 
paternalistic order (Valeri, 2009). The state-sponsored apotheosis of Sultan Qaboos means 
that his image is now everywhere – in hotel lobbies, municipal offices, on the sides of 
buildings and even painted on private automobiles. All institutions and political elites in 
Oman now actively promote Qaboos as the purveyor of unity and light. This hegemonic 
policy of idealising the Sultan has largely succeeded, and there is a widespread view among 
Omani citizens that the years prior to his rule were indeed dark ages, not to be discussed. For 
the institutionally-backed Sultanic order, the history of the time before the Renaissance 
remains politically problematic and threatening. 
 
The Sultanic hegemony rests for its legitimacy on three things: birthright, societal order and 
the idea of liberal modernity. With the complex and politically skewed tribal system 
remaining deeply entrenched, and persisting as a potential source of disorder, history is 
problematic for the political elite as it involves blood feuds, wars, massacres and 
assassinations – of tribal victors and losers – and it exposes the persistent schism between the 
coastal and interior regions. Although the state constitution, drafted in 1996, marked the 
marginalisation of the political role of the tribe, particular tribes were able to retain their 
power (Valeri, 2009). Some tribes and families benefited from the unified Sultanate, while 
others lost out. Resentments at the inequitable distribution of oil rents still rankle, and do so  
at the collective level of the tribe. The pride and reputation of those tribes who opposed the 
Sultan have been undermined by his success. 
 
Qaboos is promoted as being progressive, tolerant and forward-looking. Indeed, the Sultan’s 
legitimacy rests in part on the idea of liberal modernity, even though Oman is an autocratic 
state. History is problematic here as well, as it reveals that the abominations of the slave trade 
were integral features of the "golden age" of the Sultanic Omani empire right up until the 
nineteenth century. Indeed, slavery persisted domestically after the international ban, and it 
was only officially abolished in Oman in 1971. The current population is made up of many 
former slave or client families – categorised as three classes, the mawali, khuddam and 
bayasira – and they continue to experience social exclusion and relative deprivation today 
(Al-Azri, 2013, p. 41). 
 
With the economic need to diversify away from petrochemicals, and the aggressive 
promotion of tourism as an alternative source of national income, the country has faced the 
problematic question of how it should present its history to tourists. This is a doubly 
problematic issue in that many of the tourist attractions in the country are historical sites. In 
the 1970s, the Sultan decreed that the most significant and impressive of the forts and castles 
around the country should be rebuilt. The subsequent restoration programme has created 
world-class heritage-tourism capital; and one such site, Bahla castle, achieved World  
Heritage Site status in 1987 (UNESCO, 2018). Oman’s forts now feature strongly in its  
tourist itineraries and promotional materials (see Feighery, 2012; Hegazy, 2014). This 
programme of redevelopment of the castles has undoubtedly been a factor in the increasing 








The remainder of this paper examines the status and treatment of history in tourism in Oman, 
by examining how the country’s problematic past is obscured in contradictory ways at 
historical sites, such as castles and museums. Through discussing an ethnographic study of 
these sites, and of the people interacting with them (tourists, guides, receptionists and 
decision-makers in relevant ministries), the analysis reveals how an exotic veil over history is 
now sustained through state-imposed self-Orientalisation, and the presentation of idealised 
and sanitised versions of cultural heritage. 
 






One of the authors was working at a university in Oman, and had already lived in the country 
for five years. During this time, he had repeatedly visited historical sites, museums and   forts 
all around the country. He had begun this process as a curious tourist, but through these visits 
soon developed a keen interest in the presentation of history at such sites. Tourist activities 
thus developed into a long-term study involving multiple visits to forts, museums, harbours 
and religious sites in Oman’s regions of Dakhiliyah, Sharqiyah, Batinah, Zahirah and the city 
of Muscat (see Table 2 for the full list of the sites, and Figure 2 for the map). Through 
repeatedly visiting these places and talking to those at the sites, the author gained a  
familiarity with the locations and with visitors’ perceptions and experiences of them (van der 
Duim, 2007). Increasingly, over the five year period, Omani friends and colleagues 
accompanied him to the sites and explained the history around them. 
 
------------------------ 




From October 2016 - January 2017, the author was joined by a university colleague from the 
UK, who had come to Oman on her sabbatical leave. Early in this visit it was decided that, 
together, they would build upon the author’s pre-existing experience and knowledge of 
Oman’s historical infrastructure, and spend the next four months intensively researching into 
the management of tourism at Oman’s historical sites. Quickly, the planned study became 
focused and structured; and through discussions about theories of authenticity, Orientalism 
and the presentation of history, four broad research questions emerged: 
 
1. How does the Omani government, and its agencies, manage perceptions of history 
among tourists in Oman? 
2. What explanatory and contextual narratives are provided to tourists visiting historical 
sites and artefacts? 
3. How do tourists perceive and understand these narratives, and integrate them into 
their experiences of visiting Oman? 
4. How do tourism workers perceive and understand these narratives, and what do they 




The subsequent fieldwork involved a multimethod ethnographic approach using participant 
observation, interviews and documentary research (see Brockmann, 2011; Lassiter, 2008, 
2005; May & Pattillo-McCoy, 2000), the goal of which was to achieve a Weberian verstehen 
(Weber, 2017, p. 20-23; 1964, p. 7) – i.e., an understanding of how sense is made of  
historical sites by tourists, and by those working in the tourism industry. The rationale for 
using this multimethod approach was that we were trying to understand the perceptions, 
understandings and experiences of those who visited Oman’s historical sites, those who 
managed them, and those who worked at them. Using this methodology, the goal at the data 
analysis level was to identify perceptual and conceptual patterning among those we 
interviewed and observed. 
 
Overall, we sought to achieve, as Weber (1964, p. 99) recommended, "adequacy at the level 
of meaning", such that we gained an understanding of how tourists and practitioners 
perceived and understood the sites. A key requirement of this methodological approach was 
that our analyses and findings should be understandable, and seem reasonable, to those 
interacting with the locations. We thus maintained an active and ongoing engagement with 
participants to ensure the meaningfulness of the analyses and findings to them. As part of the 
research, we communicated our findings back to the participants, who broadly agreed with  
our analyses of their actions and understandings. 
 
Having a male and a female in a research partnership worked well in this case, with each 
gaining slightly different impressions and insights from the sites, and from interactions with 
those involved in the locations. Similarities, differences and contradictions in interpretations 
were explored through ongoing discussions between the researchers and with the participants. 
From the initial framing of the research questions onwards, this discursive element of the 
research was an integral process in the development of the analyses. Having a multi-gender 
team was advantageous in other ways - for instance, we found that the female researcher was 
better placed to approach and converse with female tourists and industry representatives. 
 
Research Structure and Activities 
 
 
The first stage of the research involved participant observation. Sometimes together and other 
times separately we visited the historical sites listed in Table 2. Some places were visited  
only a couple of times, but these provided context and insight for the ongoing development of 
the analysis. Other locations became the focus of our study; and we together repeatedly 
visited these spaces until we were satisfied that we had collaboratively achieved a broad 
verstehen, or understanding, that was adequate at the level of meaning experienced  by 
tourists visiting these locations. The particular sites that were the focus of the research were 
visited at least five times, with six places visited more than twenty times (see Table 2). The 
average visit lasted about two hours. Most of the expeditions were pre-planned, though some 
were impromptu and opportunistic. Almost all the trips resulted in useful episodes of 
participant observation. Over time, through ongoing discussions between the researchers, and 
with fellow visitors, we were able to identify patterns in the perceptions, understandings and 
experiences of those involved with the sites. The fellow tourists we spoke to were of diverse 
backgrounds, with a balance of expatriate families already living in Oman, and visitors, 
predominantly from Western Europe and North America, with Germans, French and British 
particularly well-represented. There was a balance of genders among them, and most were 
middle aged. 
 
The second stage of the fieldwork involved conversational and semi-structured interviews 
with those whose work required "front stage" contact with the visitors (Goffman, 1959,  
1961). Reisinger and Steiner (2006) observed that the tourist experience is often constructed 
through the intermediation of tour guides, and in Oman this is true for many visitors. Most of 
the research in this phase thus focused on guides. However, we also interviewed other staff at 
forts and museums, including site receptionists, security personnel and gallery attendants. We 
were interested in the narratives practitioners expressed, and in their sense of the perception 
and adoption of these narratives by visitors to the sites. Most of the interviews were 
conducted in English, though some discussions with the staff in the forts took place in  
Arabic, with the tour guides and research assistants translating the conversations. Forty-three 
interviews were conducted in this phase, with each session typically lasting from half an hour 
to an hour. In terms of the participants who were interviewed during this period: seventeen 
were tour guides; twelve were site receptionists; three were security personnel; and five were 
gallery attendants. Some of the participants were interviewed more than once. 
 
The third stage involved the participant observation of guided tours of museums and  
historical sites. This involved attending the tours, and holding informal conversations with  
the visitors and guides as the tours continued. Some of these tours were taken more than  
once. As part of our further engagement with those involved in Omani tourism, besides 
formal interviews with the tour guides and participant observation of the tours, the authors 
spent leisure time with the guides and their colleagues, engaging in informal conversations, 
eating together, and on occasions, staying at their homes with their families. The Omani tour 
guides involved in the research were predominantly men in their twenties and thirties; but we 
also toured with and interviewed a female guide in her forties. In all, we participated in 
twenty-one tours. 
 
The fourth stage involved interviewing key informants, i.e., those who worked at the policy- 
making and managerial levels in the tourism industry, and who had a significant knowledge  
of it. These included representatives at the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Heritage and 
Culture, the Ministry of Regional Municipalities and Water Resources, and the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications, along with museum directors and tourism academics who 
either had advisory roles, or were in charge of law enforcement, regulation or legislation. 
These people made decisions related to various aspects of heritage tourism development in 
Oman, involving the inclusion and crafting of particular presentations of cultural heritage in 
historical sites, tourism packages and promotional materials. Twelve such key informants 
were interviewed, with sessions usually lasting about an hour. 
 
The fifth part of the research included reading through and discussing texts and documents 
relevant to the study, such as reviews posted on TripAdvisor (tripadvisor.com), and Lonely 
Planet Thorntree Forum (lonelyplanet.com). We used this discourse more as a confirmatory 
resource in line with Geertz’s (1973) recommendation of using multiple sources of insight to 
achieve "thick description". In order to understand better the official view on certain issues, 
we also read through and discussed state documents such as the Omani constitution. 
 
These five research approaches were interrelated and took place at the same time, with the 
data and insights we received from each feeding into and informing further data collection.  
As we were guided by constructivist principles, the analysis and patterning of concepts and 
themes developed as the research progressed (Manning, 1997). We integrated this ongoing 
analytical development with a form of snowballing, whereby, as the research proceeded, 
participants supplied further insights and contacts. (Patton, 1990). Snowballing like this 
helped us to access networks, which would have been difficult to reach any other way. 
During this process of participant observation, interviews, feedback to those involved, and 
ongoing discussions between the researchers, we were able to identify certain patterns in the 
perceptions, understandings and experiences of those involved with tourist sites in Oman. 
Doing so, we distinguished themes, which enabled us to analyse the management of these 
historical sites within the broader context of the political realities in Oman. Our findings can 
be checked for validity and rigour by further studies using the same or similar methodological 
approaches. Of course, the economy and society of Oman are changing rapidly, and future 
research in this field will reflect these changes; but subsequent studies will provide a useful 
standpoint from which to evaluate the significance, limitations and usefulness of this  
research. 
 
In the following sections, we present our findings and analyses. Participants’ views are 
incorporated, with some of them quoted to support and exemplify the patterns and themes we 
uncovered. The names of the research participants, and one of the castles, are anonymised. 
 
Presentation of the findings 
 
 
Oman’s Forts – Historical sites without history 
 
 
When they go to the castle, the impression, because each castle they have special story, so the 
story is very, very like, like a fairy tale. Fairy tale for the tourist…(TG1) 
 
Three things were common to most of the castles we visited. Firstly, they had been renovated 
in the state programme of restoring many of Oman’s forts and castles. Secondly, there was an 
almost complete absence of historical information provided at these places. Thirdly, there 
were usually extensive displays of sanitised cultural heritage at the sites. At the recently 
restored UNESCO World Heritage Site of Bahla Castle, the receptionists had poor English 
and no information about the history of the place. This lack of historical context was reflected 
at other locations. There were, however, minor exceptions to this. At Jibreen castle, a wooden 
sign gave some information about the founding of the complex. Here is the text in its entirety 
(see Appendix 4): 
 
Jabreen Castle was built primarily by Imam Bil’arab bin Sultan Al Ya’rubi around 1091 AH/ 
1680 AD when he moved his capital from Nizwa to Jabreen. Imam Bil’arab died at Jabreen 
in approximately 1692, and found eternal rest in a tomb inside the castle. Muhammad bin 
Nasr Al-Ghafiri resumed building activities and made alterations to the castle in the 12th 
century AH/ 18th century AD. 
 
Likewise, in the entrance to Rustaq fort, there was a small board which mentioned that the 
Yaruba dynasty had founded the castle and evicted the Portuguese from Oman, but no 
information was provided about the events, sieges, wars and politics that the castle itself had 
been involved in up to the late twentieth century. Meanwhile the information given at Nakhal 
fort was even more scant. Here is the full text of the sign at the site (see Appendix 5): 
 
Nakhal fort, which overlooks vast palm orchards, is spectacular. It is believed to date back to 
the pre-Islamic era and is dramatically located at the edge of the Jabal Akhdar mountains in 
northwest Oman. The high location of the fort gave it a distinct and unique appearance and, 
unlike others in Oman: this fort looks like a monument carried by a gigantic hand above its 
surroundings. Nearby is a beautiful oasis and hot spring. While the source has been enclosed 
solely for viewing, the shaded rest area complete with playground makes for a welcome 
break. 
 
In this case, the only historical information given was that the site may date back to the pre- 
Islamic era. Overwhelmingly, however, Oman’s historical sites were presented without any 
history at all. Instead, some of the castles had displays of aspects of Oman’s cultural heritage, 
which were sanitised of their historical, economic, military and political contexts. A good 
example of this was the large and impressive display of cooking utensils in the old kitchen at 
Al Hazm castle (see Appendix 6). Huge pots, ladles, knives and other objects hung from the 
ceiling or were displayed on ancient tables and cutting boards. The presentation was 
obviously intended to display the wealth and fine-living of the family who had owned the 
fort; and the accompanying audio guide evoked the noise, smoke and industry of the kitchen, 
and its key role in the life of the household. The presentation was interesting and charming,  
as we made our way through the castle, and it fed into the definition of Al Hazm as an exotic, 
enchanting palace. In reality, of course, the castle’s primary role had been as a military 
establishment, which had been very much involved in bloody regional and tribal conflicts up 
until the second half of the twentieth century. Work in the kitchen of such an establishment 
would have been extremely hot and exhausting, and characterised by inequality, exploitation 
and very probably slavery. Instead of presentations on the historical, political and military 
role of the castle, and the brutality of domestic labour within it, however, the visitor 
encountered a succession of displays of sanitised cultural heritage, of which the kitchen was 
but one. 
 
The case of Nizwa fort 
 
 
Nizwa Fort is the highest profile castle in Oman. It is often featured in tourist-oriented 
promotional materials and media, and it consistently receives more tourists than any other 
castle. In 2013, the total number of visitors to the site was 97,608, and in 2015, it was  
100,899 (National Centre for Statistics and Information, 2018). Nizwa Fort was the political 
and military headquarters of various Yaruba Imams, the figureheads of the interior tribes,  
who – as we have already discussed - led military campaigns against the Sultans. The castle 
played a key role in the Jebel Akhdar War (1954-1959), during which it was pounded by 
British jets, which partly destroyed its massive outside wall (see Dye, 2008). During the 
renovation of the site in the 1980s (Hegazy, 2014), the hole in the wall was repaired, leaving 
no evidence of damage. The castle’s violent history has thereby been concealed from tourists, 
with no information given about its political and military past. 
 
This plastering over of the past is typical of the rest of Oman’s ancient castles and forts. 
During our research, we reviewed old photographs and descriptions of the sites. They 
depicted derelict and damaged structures, which clearly embodied the violence and disorder  
of their times, and indeed of the history of Oman generally. With the restoration of these 
structures from the 1970s onwards, all damage was carefully concealed, leaving grand 
complexes, sterilised of evidence of their violent and disorderly pasts. Structurally the 
restored buildings are undoubtedly magnificent, evidently embodying tourist expectations of 
what an “Arab castle” looks like. Importantly, however, the restoration has left the structures 
looking both old and new at the same time - old in the sense that they are clearly ancient 
structures, but new in that they are pristine and sanitised in appearance. The fact that they are 
both ancient and new facilitates the exoticisation of the tourist experience. It means that those 
who enter the sites feel they are walking back in time to when the castles were new. Without 
damage, decrepitude or evidence of the miseries of conflict, the sanitised structures are now 
perfect stages for the presentation of Orientalised fantasy experiences, which distract visitors 
from questions about the political history of the castles, and of Oman. 
At Nizwa, as with many of the sites, history is obscured by using specific forms of sanitised 
cultural heritage – with displays of dates-storing and processing, water management systems, 
dowry jewellery, traditional costumes and frankincense-growing and distribution. The self- 
Orientalising display of such aspects of cultural heritage works as an exotic veil over the 
castle’s violent history – charming visitors, while deflecting their interests and gaze away 
from questions of politics and military conflict. The exotic veil, the presentation of sanitised 
cultural heritage in place of history, is sustained in a powerful self-Orientalising way at many 
of these military sites – Jibreen, Nizwa, Nakhal, Rustaq, Al Hazm and Al Ain. 
 
Tourists at Nizwa Castle were enchanted by what they saw, heard and smelled: 
 
 
Perfect, perfect. Just what I dreamed of. You can imagine the people here going about their 
everyday business .. it must have been a magical time. Imagine living here back then .. it must 
have been amazing.. I sat in that room with the beautiful cushions and it was so peaceful. 
Spiritual, really. (American woman in her mid-sixties) 
 
You really get a feel of what it was like for the people living here. They obviously were very 
civilised - more than us. It’s a stunning place, isn’t it, and the views from the top take your 
breath away. I just love Oman. (British man in his forties). 
 
These two conversations took place within the walls of Nizwa castle, and were typical of 
visitors, not just to that particular site, but to other military structures throughout the country. 
Three words came up repeatedly in such conversations, which indicated that the sanitised 
staging of the restored castle, and the weaving of the exotic veil, had worked well: “magical”, 
“peaceful” and “civilised”. The word “spiritual” was also often heard. For a military  
complex, with a recent history of violence and political agitation to be described in these 
terms is remarkable. The staging and weaving of the exotic veil were thus done with great 
effect, with the frankincense, handiworks, costumes and the mountain-settings framing the 
perceptions, experiences and understandings of visiting tourists, who left feeling enchanted, 
but no wiser about the history of the site they had just visited. 
 
Al-Ain castle – unpicking the veil 
Al Ain is one of the most popular castles in Oman, and is on many tourist itineraries. We 
visited the site six times, and had long conversations with “Mohammed” (anonymised name), 
the receptionist and guide on each occasion. When we entered the castle for the first time, he 
welcomed us warmly and presented us with hand held audio guides, which, he said, visitors 
generally enjoyed using. We explored the castle first without the audio guide, so as to naively 
examine the space. Then, on our next visit, we inspected the site using the audio guide. 
 
The fortress was well signposted, with each room named in terms of its traditional function. 
There were rooms for guests, for children, for guards; the Imam’s suite of rooms,  the 
madrasa (Islamic teaching room), and there was a small school for the Imam’s children, with 
particular attention given to the presentation of the school for girls. One of the tour guides  
told us about the encounters there: 
 
Tourists are usually interested to know more about where the rooms for females and for 
males are; and they often ask about how they live. (TG1) 
 
The overall narrative of the castle, supported by plentiful cultural accoutrements and audio- 
visual presentations, was that here was the grand residence for the Imam’s family. The 
combination of beautifully presented traditional rooms and artefacts, music, charming 
fantastical stories and audio-visual presentations was designed to immerse the visitor in an 
experience of "authentic" Oman – one of Imams, luxurious living, and educated, tolerant 
people. 
 
Oman is well known for its long tradition of black magic and jinns, or genies. Notably, in the 
castle there was the “jinn’s chamber”, where a genie allegedly resided. Upon entering the 
room we were met with mysterious sounds and lights, which rendered the visit very 
entertaining and charming. There was also an enchanting story told on the audio guide about 
why it was called the jinn’s room. 
 
Also inside Al Ain castle, there was a prison, where a gruesome display showed how inmates 
were once tortured. Nothing was given its political or historical context. Who were the 
prisoners? Were they members of a rival tribe? What was the Imam’s political/ military role? 
Who were his rivals? Who did he fight against? One of the highlights of the castle was the 
grand rotunda, where a large number of ancient, colossal cannons were beautifully  displayed 
(Figure 3). Again no historical context was given. Who were the cannons shooting at? Instead 
the tourist was presented with displays of sanitised cultural heritage elaborating the domestic 
life of a rich and powerful family in 18th century Oman, while the electronic tour-phone 
guided one through the rooms, weaving stories of the Imam, genies (jinn), the plight of 
prisoners, and the luxurious baths. 
 
----------------------- 




Here, then, was a beautifully presented historical site with literally no history. Instead, 
idealised and sanitised presentations of cultural heritage had been crafted to deflect tourist 
perceptions and attention away from political and military history at every point – even in the 
cannon room. The castle infrastructure lent itself well to this Orientalised narrative, and the 
supporting audio guide was well-produced and coherent. The stories were entertaining and 
there was good use of humour throughout. As was the case with Nizwa, tourists we spoke to 
left thoroughly enchanted by their trip to Al Ain fort, but departed no wiser about the 
controversial history of the site. 
 
As we repeated our visits and developed a friendly rapport with Mohammed, the receptionist 
and main guide, he began to express bitterness about the presentation of the castle, and 
identified lots of social problems in the surrounding area. He sadly observed that many  
people in the Interior were poor, due to state corruption. When we asked about disability 
access to the castle, he said that they had received the funds to build this, but the money had 
suddenly disappeared. Again, he put this down to corruption. This theme was  reflected 
among many of the tour guides we spoke to. 
 
Mohammed was unhappy with how the things were presented at the castle, and on the audio 
guide. He singled out the torture exhibition of the prison, saying it was not in the spirit of 
Ibadi Islam to treat prisoners in that way – drawing similarities between this presentation and 
how Islam is presented in the media in the West. He criticised the way features of the castle 
had been “spiced-up” to make them more interesting to visitors. He was all for talking about 
Oman’s heritage, but was not in favour of exoticising it for the sake of tourists and tourism. 
For Mohammed, this was not simply a matter of facilitating "easy" consumption through 
simplification of historical complexity, but of presenting a dream-like fantasy, rather than the 
brute reality of the castle’s military history (Bryce, 2012). 
 
Mohammed talked of the recent history of the castle; of how it had been used as a base for 
British troops in their military campaign against the Sultan’s enemies, who operated in the 
mountains during the Jebel al Akhdar war. He showed us old video footage of the castle in a 
ruined, war-ravaged state. The film showing the derelict castle was not presented to visitors. 
We had first met Mohammed in his front-stage incarnation (Goffman, 1959, 1961), where he 
helped us along in the Orientalisation of the castle, offering dates and kahwa (Omani 
traditional coffee with cardamom), traditional Omani hospitality, encouraging us to immerse 
ourselves in the cultural heritage presentations provided. However, through questioning and 
engagement with him over several visits, the conversations shifted backstage - behind the veil 
- where he presented a startlingly different definition of the castle and its presentation – one 
not of exotic cultural heritage, but of oppression, military might and tribal and state violence. 
The same transition happened with many of our industry interviewees. We met them in the 
front-stage tourist sphere, in front of the veil, where their job was to stage authenticity 
through self-Orientalisation – but as our relationships deepened, the settings, dress and 
definitions of the historical sites and their presentations changed markedly as the veil was 
lifted. 
 
Museums, ports and slavery 
 
 
As mentioned, the museum at Nizwa castle presented no meaningful history, only a narrow 
and sanitised cultural heritage. Ironically, perhaps, the exclusion of history and its 
replacement with sanitised presentations of cultural heritage was at its most complete in the 
National Museum of Oman, the repository of many of the country’s most significant 
historical artefacts. Here weapons were displayed without mentioning tribal conflicts or civil 
wars; Omani ships, or dhows, were displayed as artefacts of the "great maritime empire", 
without once mentioning their role in the slave trade. The narrative was of an enlightened, 
powerful, maritime nation with a rich culture, with displays and texts at each of the exhibits 
carefully – and successfully – crafted to enhance the touristic experience of authenticity. 
Cumulatively, this wove an Orientalist spell on the observer, reinforcing the exoticness and 
alterity of the culture-rich space, and thereby of the country as a whole (see Korpela, 2010). 
Miniature models of the major castles were exhibited without any mention of their use as 
military establishments, or the wars they were involved in. 
 
An exotic veil was thereby drawn over each historical artefact. The combination of staged 
authenticity with exaggerated Orientalism charmed the visitor, who was encouraged at every 
step to see Oman as a unified, exotic, culture-rich place. Within this experiential space, 
questions of conflict, contradiction, politics did not arise; and tourists left the museum 
enchanted with the unique otherworldly heritage of the “country” and “people” of Oman. At 
the very heart of the presentation of Omani history – the National Museum – history was 
excluded, and a strongly Orientalised presentation of cultural heritage put in its place. 
 
One of our key informants concerning the National Museum was a highly-educated and 
eloquent Omani senior government executive, who provided us with interesting insights into 
the self-Orientalisation of Oman, and the replacement of history with sanitised cultural 
heritage at historical sites, including the National Museum: 
 
When we looked at the underlying philosophical principles of museography plans 
internationally and regionally, we did not foresee undertaking traditional paths. At the 
national historic museum in Moscow for example, the emphasis is on chronological timeline 
with the focus on the achievements of that nation under a particular ruler. So it has a 
particular hierarchical reading of history of that nation. And we did not foresee this 
approach. Then there was another approach where you have a chronological approach in the 
broader sense starting from the earliest period to the most recent. And we did not foresee that 
either. We have decided to go … to adopt a thematic approach whereby we combine thematic 
links in the chronological context or vice versa. The reason for that was to create a thought 
provoking experience, an experience that would sound and feel on you, even to local 
residents, so we tried to present a history of the cultural heritage of Oman from that aspect. 
 
The Ministries thus pursued a policy of intentionally displacing history with Orientalised 
cultural heritage in the presentation of historical sites and artefacts. 
 
Besides the National Museum, two of the most popular tourist hot-spots, the ports of Muttrah 
and Sur, are historically controversial, as they were key hubs in the slave trade (Alpers & 
Hopper, 2017; Suzuki, 2017; Al Ghailani, 2015). This was not mentioned in any tourism 
information or display at the sites, and every day foreign tourists flocked to these locations 
completely oblivious to their recent slaving roles. Instead, at Muttrah port, thousands of 
tourists shuffled around the narrow streets of the traditional market, or souq, breathing 
frankincense-laden air and picking out traditional Omani handicrafts, jewellery, head-ware 
and veils – oblivious to the fact that this, relatively recently, had been a locus of the slave 
trade (see Clarence-Smith, 2013). They were also oblivious to the fact that most of the self- 
Orientalising Omanis in the enchanting souq stores themselves shopped at thoroughly  
modern supermarkets in Muscat, such as Lulu or Carrefour. 
 
Slavery is taboo in Oman, as it highlights ethnically-based structural inequalities that persist 
today, and it contradicts the liberal modern ethos of the Sultanic order. Any mention of it has 
been sterilised from civic life, excluded from public narratives or presentations of history, 
particularly those to tourists. Indeed, in one interview with a senior key informant from the 
Ministry of Tourism, when we asked about slavery, we were told in no uncertain terms, 
 
We all live together in peace here in Oman. We are all Omanis. There is no need to dig up 
stuff like slavery, as it is all forgotten now. 
 
We asked about slavery again in interviews at a parallel institution, the Ministry of Heritage 
and Culture. Again, we received the answer – "we are all Omanis now". We were also told by 
officials at the ministry that they were afraid to speak about slavery, as mentioning it was 
inappropriate – even illegal. One informant claimed he could end up in prison for referring to 
it, particularly in written mode. As the interviews in the ministries proceeded, it became 
increasingly apparent that both the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Heritage and 
Culture were intentionally keeping any word about slavery from presentations of, and 
narratives about, historical artefacts and sites. They were also deeply cautious about being 
seen to be doing so. 
 
When we discussed the issue of slavery with one of the tour guides, he said that, at home, 
some former slave families still have a contract with their former owners, and that this 
contract is still respected. For instance, if members of former slave families wish to move out 
of the country, change religion, get married or buy property, their former masters have to 
approve the decision. It is also the custom that when there is a major celebration in the  home 
of former masters, it is the duty of former slaves to attend and to be presented as slaves, as it 
enhances the noble status of the family. 
 
However, Article 12 of the Omani constitution states, 
 
 
Collaboration and compassion are intimate bonds amongst the Citizens. The reinforcement  
of the national unity is a duty. The State shall prevent anything that might lead to division, 
discord or disruption of the national unity. 
 
The imperative for national unity and equality thus appears to hold sway in institutional and 
public discourse. However, it is apparent that deeply seated norms, customs and vernacular 
knowledge prevail in the confines of Oman’s homes, families and private spheres; and it is 
clear that in localised situations they can and do take precedence over state regulations. 
 
Article 12 of the Omani Constitution also pronounces the following: 
 
 
The family is the basis of the society and the Law regulates the means for protecting it, … 
 
 
In interviews, we were repeatedly reminded that Omanis were living in the time of “Sultanic 
renaissance” and “national rebirth”. Citizens are officially equal when it comes to 
international human rights and the state constitution, but local mores continue to hold sway in 
the relationships between the different parts of Omani societies. The Omanis we interviewed 
knew full well that they were not equal, but would not discuss this in public. In the public 
sphere, they presented themselves and their country in terms of being one nation, with all 
citizens being equal. This was the narrative required and presented by government and its 
agents in the tourism industry. However, the reality of recent Omani history has been of 
divisions, violence and inequalities that persist to this day. Because the discussion of history 
inevitably highlights present day division, potential violence and inequalities, the state has 
engaged in a partially successful campaign of defining anything pre-1970 as being of the dark 
ages, and therefore irrelevant. 
 
Castles are a big part of Oman’s tourism capital, and its pull on international visitors. Given 
the country’s violent, sectarian and oppressive history, the government of Oman has faced the 
problem of how to present history at these sites. The solution pursued by the state and its 
agents has been to uphold an exotic veil of idealised cultural heritage to obscure history 
altogether. This has been implemented throughout the tourist industry in the most systematic 
and thorough ways. The war-damaged, derelict castles of forty years ago have been rebuilt 
and restored, and are unquestionably spectacular. Within them, carefully crafted versions of 
traditional cultural heritage are used to veil tourist perceptions from Oman’s violent and 
divisive history. Images of restored castles and idealised cultural heritage are effective in 
promoting a highly Orientalised social construction of Oman to potential visitors, and in 
exoticising the tourist experience during their visits. Tourists are thus attracted to an exotic 
self-Orientalising Oman, and they visit and leave the country charmed and impressed, with  
no inkling of its violent history and persistent political divisions and social inequalities. This 
is exactly what the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Heritage and Culture want, and  
in economic terms the exotic veil has worked well as a policy. 
 
Behind the veil – discussions with the tour guides 
 
 
Tour guides are key agents in promoting the narratives, which sustain the exotic veil over 
history in Oman (see Dahles, 2002). Their explanations and stories at historical sites are not 
politically neutral, but are accountable to the policies managed and sustained by the state. The 
guides we interviewed were highly sensitive to the dominant hegemonic imperatives, and the 
need to compound the Orientalist expectations of the visitors. They emphasised that visitor 
interest tended to focus on the culture, particularly on trying to find cultural differences  
which supported the Orientalised binary between "East" and "West". Although there were 
occasional questions about history, these were quickly defused or deflected. The main 
questions tourists asked related to culture and family life, and relations between males and 
females. The interactions between the tour guides and the visitors thus involved the co- 
creation of the exotic, other, Orientalised Oman: 
 
Okay, they [tourists] will ask about the weddings, if there’s still arranged marriage here or 
now is a boy have to find the girl. (TG3, male) 
 
Further, another male tour guide said that almost every tourist asked the following question, 
 
 
Why are men allowed to have four wives? (TG4, male) 
Tour guides sometimes commented that they found some of the questions to be rather 
ridiculing their culture. As one of them mentioned: 
 
I really do not like when they ask me how many brothers and sisters I have and when I tell 
them, they start giggling and laughing at me, or in the best case they say "wow". I find it very 
rude to make so much fun out of my family. (TG3, male) 
 
Sometimes tourists try to elaborate the binary cultural differences, 
 
 
They ask sometimes a very stupid question you know. If you’re married can you kiss your  
wife in front of your parents? (TG2, male) 
 
Omani tour guides were frustrated by a number of expatriates living in Oman who were also 
operating as local tour guides. These expats did not need to pass exams, but only to register 
with the Ministry of Tourism, whilst local guides had to pass an examination and a language 
test. Omani tour guides worked mostly for travel agents, whilst expatriate guides were 
predominantly freelancers, thus enjoying more freedom than the local guides. The Omanis 
said that expatriate tour guides exoticised cultural differences and binaries even more than 
they did, often making exaggerated observations at the expense of the locals, to entertain and 
enchant the tourists. We went to one of these tours, and the gentle mocking of the “culturally 
different” locals was a feature throughout. When they heard it, the Omani tour guides felt that 
their culture, values and lifestyle were being misrepresented. 
 
And over that they’re not giving the right information to the guest because we have some 
places ladies they cover and some of them don’t cover you know. They’re saying, you know, 
because her husband he told she must, she will be covered, but this is not true. I heard it. 
(TG3, male) 
 
Whereas such statements were uncritically and enthusiastically received by most  tourists, 
they were resented by the Omani guides. Although both locals and expatriates were in the 
business of Orientalising Oman’s history and culture, it was felt that the expatriates did so in  
a negative way that portrayed Omanis not just as different, but as inferior to the tourists: 
But some of them they give wrong information about my country. I feel nervous, I feel angry.  
I want to stop them but I respect the tourist but sometime if I get offense I stop them. (TG1, 
female) 
 
So he [expat tour guide] has say [sic] something very bad about the local people. They 
should respect the people in this area. (TG1, female) 
 
Trivialising local cultures as odd, strange, exotic, charming, backward or traditional are 
common Orientalising methods in tourism. Encouraged by the highly exoticised promotional 
material and media, tourists come to Oman expecting and seeking these narratives about 
alterity; and tour guides see it as part of their roles to provide and embody such 
characterisations, even though these contradict their actual lifestyles and opinions. The 
Orientalisation of Oman and its culture is thus arguably an act of co-creation. Visitors gasp, 
chuckle and wow at the vagaries of Omani cultural heritage, as the tour guides (both Omani 
and expatriate) obscure a violent history, a police state, censorship, corruption and social 
inequality, by weaving a fragrant veil of Orientalist spells around the visitors. 
 
As we have noted above, tourism practitioners can find themselves in the position of having  
to resist, ameliorate or become complicit in the obscuring of their own history. Local tour 
guides invariably dress in traditional costume, wear intoxicating oud perfume to enhance the 
sensory Orientalist experience, and tell stories of jinns, great empires and, above all, of the 
great Sultan Qaboos. Thus, on one side, the guides both embody and act out the state policy  
of self-Orientalisation. Meanwhile, the type of tourists who employ the services of a tour 
guide, are usually highly receptive to this - they actively want the exotic, and the charming 
Orientalist narratives and discourse. 
 
This point was reflected by TG1, who observed that the exoticisation of Omani culture 
involves "talking the language of the tourists, this is what they want to hear". Complex 
historical legacies are thus simplified for commercial and operational reasons, and these 
characterisations resonate with particular civilisational assumptions consumers carry with 
them. According to Guattari (1989) the process of experience creation is often masked by 
slogans invoking certain states of mind; for instance, reinforcing and normalising binary 
distinctions between East (Islam) and West (European Christendom). Guattari (1989) further 
argues  that only if subjects  are critically alert to  discourse manipulation  can their sense   of 
meaning of the heritage sites be truly co-creational. Thus, according to this view, the  
selective use, interpretation and commodification of the past becomes less of a co-creation 
between the consumer, tour guide and the site; and more of a power-led exercise, enacting an 
illusion of co-creation. 
 
The Orientalised narrative sustained by the Ministry of Tourism is coherent and successful in 
excluding history, while providing “authentic” experiences for visitors. However, 
contradictions remain that threaten the narrative’s coherence and sustainability. Many of the 
tour guides are relatively young, urban, Net-savvy and globalised in culture; and they lead 
recognisably Western, modern lifestyles. From our interviews it became apparent that the 
disjunctures between their lives of, for instance, drinking in bars and going to Muscat rock 
concerts, and their work presentations of traditional authenticity, meant they were acting-out 
an idealised, sanitised version of what it was to be “Omani”. In their staging of authenticity 
for tourists, many thus experienced strong existential feelings of inauthenticity to themselves 
and the modern urban life of which they were a part. As features of this staged authenticity 
and the weaving of Orientalism, they sanitised history from their presentations and from 
replies to queries. This exacerbated the existential contradictions embedded in their identity. 
 
In a Nizwa hotel, we met two off-duty tour guides in Western clothes, drinking beer and 
smoking cigarettes. They had carefully positioned themselves out of sight, in case any of their 
tour participants ventured into the same bar. In Goffman’s (1961) terms, they were spatially 
and symbolically backstage. In our first encounter with them, we explained that we were 
researchers; we played pool with them, and asked them a number of questions. After a 
friendly discussion, one of us asked if they ever mentioned slavery in their presentations. 
They went quiet. One of them eventually replied that slavery is not something that anyone 
talks about. 
 
For tour guides, the existential contradictions sustained by the Sultanic hegemony are keenly 
felt, and lead to feelings of powerlessness and betrayal of their identities. Tribal allegiance is 
a foundational feature of Omani society, with tribal conflicts and collective injustices within 
living memories discussed in homes and villages. As we were told by one of the research 
participants: "every family has one ‘uncle’ who knows about the history. We speak about it in 
the family". Further we were told that in school, there is only "general  history", nothing  
about the detailed political/ military history of Oman. History is private, not public - a subject 
which is only discussed at home. As the research proceeded, it became apparent that this is a 
history that may be lost over the next few generations. 
 
The past is thus obscured by the state, with a Sultanic, history-less, unity imposed upon the 
very people whose job it is to enlighten others about historical sites. Although the exotic veil, 
the front-stage presentation of authentic Orientalism, is overwhelmingly sustained, our 
research allowed us backstage, behind the veil, into the lives of those whose job it was to 
present it. Here the views on the required performance were strongly expressed. The castle 
receptionist mentioned before, whose job was to present a traditional Omani welcome and 
explain the electronic hand-held tour guide device, was clearly angry at the state-imposed 
narratives and presentations at the site. He complained that parts of the staging in particular 
rooms were simply made up for tourist consumption, and misrepresented their original usage 
and contextual history. Key in this, he made the point (reflected in other backstage  
interviews) that the tensions and contradictions that gave rise to the Jebel al Akhdar war were 
still there, and could reappear if the Sultanic-imposed unity were to weaken. 
 
The government of Oman is not as unified as people are encouraged to believe. There are 
tensions between the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Heritage and Culture, for 
instance. The Ministry of Heritage and Culture is responsible for archaeological activity in  
the Sultanate and it was this organisation that oversaw the restoration of many of the castles. 
The complexes were then passed over to the Ministry of Tourism for marketing; and the 
subsequent exclusion of history from the site narratives has caused tensions with those at that 
Ministry of Heritage and Culture who can clearly see the sterilisation of Oman’s past for 
touristic purposes. With tourism being promoted as a key strategic industry in the 
diversification of Oman away from petrochemicals, the Ministry of Tourism has been able to 
sustain this policy, along with the support of conservative elements within the government 
who wish the narrative of post 1970 unity and equality to prevail seamlessly from the 





The aim of this study was to understand how history is treated in tourist settings in Oman,  
and to reveal the reasons behind the shielding of visitors from history via a form of state- 
imposed self-Orientalism. Tourists were visiting sites like Bahla fort with little historical 
information. Many left enchanted, but some later felt confused about what they had seen, and 
expressed this in discussions on sites such as TripAdvisor. For some, it seemed that authentic 
experiences and intoxicating Orientalism were not enough, and they asked, “Where’s the 
history?” This question is key to the whole issue of historical sites in Oman, for without 
adequate contextualisation, visitors are unable to understand what they are looking at. Of 
course, most tourists we spoke to were satisfied with their experiences at the sites, enthusing 
about the beauty and charm of them – the exotic veil had done its job. However, for a 
minority, the Orientalist enchantment left them intellectually dissatisfied. 
 
For tour guides and site receptionists weaving authenticity and Orientalism, the denial of 
history is an existential issue, as it renders them complicit in the suppression of their own 
identity. This is a major issue for the development of Oman as a country, and raises the 
question of how long history can be sterilised from civic and touristic discourse in the name  
of Sultanic unity. 
 
Weber’s (1978) ideas encourage us to understand and explain (verstehen and erklärung) the 
reasons why institutions, dependent upon the unifying figure of the Sultan, seek to glorify 
post-1970 history, and to underplay, censor or exclude much of the time before his accession. 
We found both internal and external reasons for state sanctioned histories. From the internal 
side, state institutions have the power and authority to do this, as – for all its  avowed 
tolerance – Oman is an autocratic state with no free press. History, then, is crafted,  
legitimised and enforced by the state in its schools, newspapers, media and universities. 
State-censored history thus prevails in Oman from the level of the citizenship, through to 
universities and into the ministries. If mentioned at all, the civil wars are cast as troubled  
steps on the path to unified modernity; the blood feuds and tribal wars are glossed over; and 
the slave trade is excluded from discourse in all public arenas, though cautiously discussed in 
the privacy of family homes. 
 
Although imposing an exotic veil of self-Orientalism is an effective management strategy for 
obscuring history in the short term, it suppresses hard contradictions among tourists and 
citizens alike – and for the country as a whole. This may not be sustainable. With economic 
development, an urban middle class has emerged, globalised in its outlook, moving rapidly 
away from the traditional values and norms that characterised life in the Sultanate only  
twenty years ago. In spite of its economic and social development to date, the troubled 
history of the country sustains stressors, divisions and inequities that are  keenly felt  and 
retain their potential for disruption and conflict. Obscuring history in the name of Sultanic 
unity in a time of huge cultural change, and a high proportion of young people, means that 
these contradictions are exacerbated. If social and political developments are to feed into 
Oman’s now faltering economic development, the obscuring of history should give way to 
open debate about it, and of the contradictions and inequities it sustains. For Oman, moving 
away from an exotic veil over the past to a more historically grounded visitor experience will 
mean that those involved in the growing tourist industry will be better able to resolve the 
contradictions between their work and their identity, and reclaim their history and identity in 






The conceptual development and findings of this study can help us understand how and why 
some national governments seek to manage and control tourist-oriented narratives about 
historic sites and artefacts. In this paper, we have examined a particular method in the 
management and control of historical sites in Oman, which we characterise as the use of an 
exotic veil - the obscuring of history through self-Orientalisation and sanitised presentations 
of cultural heritage. The identification of this method of political censorship raises the 
question of its transferability - in other words, is the exotic veil also used in other countries? 
 
Although government tourism departments in other parts of the world may encourage self- 
Orientalisation in promotional materials and among practitioners, in most cases this is not 
done to conceal history, but merely to encourage tourism to those countries. Government 
agencies may certainly encourage self-Orientalisation, but not require it. This is arguably the 
case in the management of tourism in places such as Malaysia and India (see, for instance, 
Kerrigan, Shivanandan & Hede, 2012). In Thailand, self-Orientalisation is certainly 
widespread, though it is not imposed, except arguably in the hill-tribe areas, where local 
economies depend upon displays of exotic authenticity (Cohen, 1989). In these areas, tourists 
are presented with displays of exotic cultural heritage, while the violent and insecure recent 
history of the hill tribes is obscured (Latt & Roth, 2015; Wittayapak, 2008). 
In some states, political elites sustain their power through suppressing division and dissent. In 
certain Gulf Arab countries, for instance, post-independence unity is actively imposed by the 
state (Hanieh, 2016). As Cooke (2014) observed, this is reflected in the requirement to wear 
uniform “national dress” at work and in public life. Such displays of unity, however, hide 
diversity and division. The political legacies of such countries’ histories are deeply 
controversial and divisive. The history of the region up until independence was of colonial 
hegemony, tribal rivalries, confessional tensions and the persistence of slavery, which was 
only officially banned in these countries in the 1970s (see Cooper, 2013). 
 
As Hanieh, (2016) highlights, these states are usually politically and economically dominated 
by one clan, which typically controls and exploits the country’s petrochemical wealth. The 
persistent dominance of these families is widely resented among those tribes that lost out in 
the post-independence settlements; and among former slave families, which continue to 
experience exploitation and discrimination (see Alpers, & Hopper, 2017; Alsudairi & 
Abusharaf, 2015). In such countries it does appear that the carefully crafted government- 
sustained exotic veil distracts visitors from the region’s recent history of tribal rivalries and 
slavery. Highly Orientalised images and sounds are used in promotional media for Gulf 
countries’ tourist industries, and exoticised displays of cultural heritage await visitors to the 
region’s museums and historical sites (see Stephenson, 2014). This is true in Bahrain, where 
the exotic veil obscures an explosive historically-rooted political gulf between the majority 
Shia population and the Sunni ruling family (Gengler, 2014). In Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia is 
seeking to diversify into international tourism (Thompson, 2017). Given the country’s recent 
history of war, tribal rivalry, confessional violence and political and economic domination by 
the House of Saud, it will be interesting to see how the government manages the problematic 
question of history, and presents its numerous historical sites to tourists. 
 
There is much future research to be done, then, on the management and control of history in 
tourism around the world. Whereas, the exotic veil appears to be a feature of Gulf states other 
than Oman, further research on particular countries in the region is needed to verify this, and 
to refine and develop this conceptual approach. Certainly, other countries further  afield 
appear to use imposed self-Orientalisation and cultural heritage in similar ways; and it seems 
likely that future researchers will find elements of the exotic veil in the management of 
tourism in countries such as Myanmar and China. 
Finally, this is a study of the management of tourism, or, to be more specific, the  
management of history in tourism. What tourism management lessons are to be learned from 
this study? The first is that those in government in certain states have clearly identified their 
own history as a threat, and decided that it must be carefully contained and managed in 
tourism activities and materials. With the advent of social media, such governments perceive 
(perhaps rightly) that history has become even more of a threat, as discussions of wars, 
massacres and slavery can quickly become amplified and result in political criticism of the 
ruling elites, and damage the tourist brand of the country. In order to deal with this problem, 
such governments have developed promotional and operational tourism policies that enable 
the economy to benefit from mass tourism while keeping history hidden. The development of 
the exotic veil as a policy is arguably a creative and effective response to perceived political 
threats posed by a problematic past and historically-rooted social problems. Where the policy 
first originated, and who developed it are fascinating questions, which further researchers  
may wish to explore. At the management research level these questions raise issues  of 
agency, decision-making and contingency, which again are interesting areas in the 
development of this research theme. 
 
In line with Weber’s erklärung, which seeks to understand the laws and regulations which 
guide the process of reaching "adequacy at the level of meaning" (Weber, 1964, p. 99) it is 
important to understand the external context, i.e. "the context of the context" (Askegaard & 
Linnet, 2011, p. 396) in which history is silenced in presentations to tourists and visitors. 
Those dictating policy in government ministries in Oman are conscious that their country 
borders neighbours with troubled reputations (Lewis, 2015): Yemen, where a vicious civil 
war is now happening; and Saudi Arabia, where human rights are problematic (Wald, 2018). 
With recent violent disorder in Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Syria and Iraq, Oman – 
understandably – is seeking to distance itself from the instability and violence in the region. 
The fact that it too suffered from violent civil war and tribal conflict up until 1975 
undermines the notion that Oman is different from other Arab countries - that it is stable and 
safe. All discussion of instability and conflict is therefore expunged from touristic discourse. 
 
What we see from this study is that to date in Oman, and potentially in other countries as  
well, government managers and decision-makers have seen history as the problem, and the 
exotic veil as the solution. In terms of the future social, economic and political development  
of these countries, the case can be made, however, that the veil has become the problem. It  is 
widely resented by those people who work in the tourism industry, who, on a daily basis, are 
obliged to misrepresent their history and their identities. It stifles real and arguably necessary 
social, political and economic change, and it has become a barrier to meaningful 
communication between tourists and locals. What then is the solution to the exotic veil? How 
should it itself be resolved? The answer is seemingly simple, but manifold in its  implications 
- it should be removed, and the country’s complex and fascinating history revealed to all. If 
this is done, the country will become understandable to tourists as having a past that is just as 
violent, complex and troubled as any European or American state - indeed, having a past that 
is just as violent and complex as visitors’ own countries back home. Tourists will continue to 
come and amaze at the castles and historical sites, but this time they will be able to be more 
engaged with the realities of what they are seeing. With the removal of the exotic veil,  
tourism will not collapse, as the tourist infrastructure and support structure remain. With the 
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